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THE MAGNA CARTA OF THE DEFENDANT
ACCORDING TO THE NEW BILL OF
RIGHTS IN ISRAEL -
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Emanuel Grosst
A. INTRODUCTION.
The enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Lib-
erty' has been defined as a "constitutional revolution."2 The
primary purpose of this article is to discuss the Basic Law's im-
pact on criminal law and on defendants' rights, as well as ad-
dress many questions that arise about the Basic Law's scope
and its implications on various legal fields. Furthermore, this
article will expose the problematic reality created when the new
Basic Law interacts with the existing legislation and case law.
Through a comparison to the Canadian legal system, it will
point to possible new and progressive directions in the develop-
ment of the Israeli legal system.
Prior to the enactment of the Basic Law, a defendant's ba-
sic rights in criminal law were anchored in Israeli legislation
and case law. Procedural criminal law is now subject to the Ba-
sic Law and filled with meaning by its principles. The Basic
t Law Lecturer at Tel Aviv University and Haifa University located in Israel;
Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, Villanova Law School 1995; Visiting Scholar,
Faculty of Law, Yale Law School 1990; Chief Judge for the District Military Court
of Israel 1987 - 1993; J.S.D., LL.M, LL.B., Tel Aviv University.
1 Israel has no written constitution. It has a series of basic laws which were
meant to be temporary substitutes for a formal Constitution [hereinafter Basic
Law].
In 1950, the Knesset (the Parliament) passed a resolution by which the formal
Constitution would be drawn by a series of Basic Laws. The Knesset has since
enacted sporadic Basic Laws establishing state institutions and authorities. For
example, the Basic Law: The Knesset; Basic Law: The Judiciary; Basic Law: The
Government; and Basic Law: The State Comptroller. Shoshana Netanyahu, The
Supreme Court Of Israel: A Safeguard Of The Rule Of Law, 5 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1,
13-14 (1993).
2 AHARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION IN LAw, PART III, CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-
PRETATION 313 (1994).
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Law opened the way for interpretive changes of existing rules,
thus, broadening defendant's rights in criminal law and al-
lowing judicial review of future legislation. It is also very signif-
icant in shaping these rights in the future and to the
establishment of minimal standards in order to prevent the lim-
itation of the rights of the defendant. Moreover, today, it ap-
pears that the defendant can demand legislative involvement.
According to section 4 of the Basic Law, when a defendant has a
right unenforceable under a previous law, the defendant can pe-
tition the court for its recognition and special legislation for en-
forcement of that right.
The constitutional purpose of criminal law is to guarantee
basic conditions for social existence. The defendant's rights in
criminal law stand for the principle of an individual's freedom
and human dignity. These rights are anchored in principles of
liberal democracy and are based on the assumption recognizing
the individual as a rational being with personal autonomy.
The draft law included the defendant's overall rights in
criminal law which were not adopted in the Basic Law passed
by the Knesset. This would seem to deny higher legislative sta-
tus to these rights. However, the rights of the defendant stem
from the rights to life, dignity and personal liberty. Once these
rights have been incorporated into the Basic Law, it can be im-
plied that the defendant's overall rights are also incorporated.
Although this is the dominant view in legal literature, this issue
has yet to be addressed by case law.3
The Basic Law was designed in large part according to the
Canadian Charter.4 In addition to the general rights to life, lib-
3 See Yehudit Karp, The Criminal Law: Yanus of Human Rights, 42 HA'AK-
LIT 64 (1995). Sections 2,4,5 and section 1A (the Purpose) of the Basic Law may
serve as a sufficient basis for anchoring procedural rights in criminal proceedings.
See BARAK, supra note 2, at 282, 432. "Alongside the legislation of these
rights, they will stand on their own as particularly right. As long as they have not
been legislated, they are protected in the framework of the principle of human
dignity."
4 Compare with § 2 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1994)
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt.I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 7 (protecting life, body, and dignity) [hereinafter the Charter]. See also
§ 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1994) with CAN. CONST. (Con-
stitution Act, 1982) pt.I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 1 (proscrib-
ing the reasonable limits of state violations of rights).
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erty and personal security, 5 the Charter adopted specific rights
which guarantee procedural justice for the defendant in crimi-
nal law. Therefore, this discussion will compare, examine and
analogize the Basic Law and the Charter as they pertain to de-
fendants' rights. Based on the Charter's life and liberty section,
Canadian courts have broadened the rights of defendants be-
yond those established in other sections. For example, section 7
of the Charter served as the basis for guaranteeing both the de-
fendant's right to silence in investigative proceedings and the
right to legal aid. Nonetheless, section 7 qualifies and limits
such rights. For instance, infringement on the right to life, lib-
erty and bodily integrity is limited by the principles of basic jus-
tice. 6 In section 8, the protection against the violation of
privacy by way of search and seizure is extended only to unrea-
sonable search and seizure. Moreover, section 9 only protects
the defendant against arbitrary detention or arrest.
It should be noted that there are substantive differences be-
tween the Canadian and Israeli legal systems. First, the Israeli
Basic Law, as opposed to the Charter, does not specify the pro-
tected rights of the criminal defendant. Rather, these protec-
tions are implied from the rights of dignity and liberty.
However, it is clear that these rights, as any other basic right,
are not absolute, but rather relative. The qualifications and
limitations are not anchored in the Basic Law itself, and must
be inferred from the basic principles of the legal system, the ex-
isting legislation and the development of these rights in case
law. Analogies from the Charter must be drawn carefully,
adapting the rules to the particular conditions existing in
Israel, the principles of its criminal law and the entire legisla-
tive framework. Second, a further substantive difference is
found in section 1A, which adds the Jewish values of the state
and the principles of the Israeli Declaration of Independence of
1948 to its democratic values. This addition is unique to the
Israeli legal system and one should assume that it will leave its
mark on the interpretation and ramifications of the Basic Law.
5 CAN. CoNsT.(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 7.
6 The United States Constitution also proscribes the infringement of a per-
sons life, liberty and bodily integrity. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1996]
3
PACE INT'L L. REV.
A further preliminary question which arises in the context
of the basic rights and the rights of the defendant is whether
the former and the latter are relative to one another. Would it
not be appropriate to grant the defendant basic guarantees of
life and liberty through the recognition of absolute fundamental
basic rights which do not "compete" in the balancing of other
rights.
This question arises primarily when facing the fear of a se-
rious infringement on the defendant's basic rights7 by govern-
mental authorities in the name of state security and public
interest principles. Indeed, state security and public interest
could be so important that they justify an infringement, and
even denial, of one or another of the defendant's rights. How-
ever, the power inherent in state security and public interest
raises a great fear that they will be used as a device for justifica-
tion of such violations retroactively, thereby depleting any real
meaning given to the defendant's rights.
The Israeli legal system has not yet recognized absolute
rights. It has defined the limits of all the basic rights by balanc-
ing competing values and contrasting rights. The reason ap-
pears to stem from the recognition that any right deemed
absolute is too rigid. This does not leave room to consider the
unforeseen circumstances of a case which may justify the sacri-
fice of one right in the face of another.
B. THE RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY
Section 7 of the Charter states that "[elveryone has the
right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice." Similar values are anchored in section
2 of the Basic Law: "There shall be no violation of the life, body
or dignity of any person as such." In addition, section 4 of the
Basic Law states that "[aill persons are entitled to protection of
their life, body and dignity." A person's dignity and liberty have
won special constitutional status. Taken literally, there are dif-
ferences between section 7 of the Charter and the Basic Law's
sections 2 and 4. While section 7 of the Charter protects liberty
and personal security, the Basic Law refers to bodily integrity
7 See infra section G.
.94 [Vol. 8:91
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and dignity, but does not refer to liberty and personal security.
However, the difference is purely semantic, and it appears that
on a substantive level they are identical terms. The purpose of
"liberty" in section 7 of the Charter is to protect a person's au-
tonomy, dignity and privacy.8 Disturbance of bodily integrity
or enjoyment constitutes a violation of the right to personal se-
curity. Some Canadian courts have also recognized the right to
privacy and dignity as part of the right to personal security.9 It
is worth noting that the Basic Law does not make these values
subject to the principles of basic justice. However, one can see
such a condition as implicit in the restrictive language con-
tained in section 8 of the Basic Law and derived from the values
of Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state. 10
Sections 8-14 of the Charter 1 protect specific rights of the
defendant, such as: the right to counsel, the presumption of in-
nocence and the privilege against self-incrimination. Any viola-
tion of these rights constitutes an infringement of the
defendant's right to life, liberty and security and are not in ac-
cord with the principles of basic justice. The purpose of these
provisions is to protect the fairness of the criminal process, even
at the cost of diminishing its efficiency. 12
Sections 8-14 of the Charter define specific rights which are
inferred from the general right to freedom, life and security
granted to the defendant in section 7.13 These are only exam-
8 STUART JAMES WHITLEY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTION 170
(1989).
9 Regina v. Dyment [1984], 12 C.C.C. (3d) 551 (P.E.I.S.C.); RE K v. Public
Trustee [1985], 19 D.L.R. (4th) 255 (B.C.C.A.); Regina v. Mills [1986], 1 S.C.R. 863,
919-20. See also, Regina v. Beare [1987], 34 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 203 (Sask.C.A.)(the
right to dignity as integral to the security of the person).
10 See Karp, supra note 3, at 73.
11 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 8-14.
12 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 24(2) establishes the evidence obtained by serious infringement of
the defendant's rights will not be accepted as admissible evidence in court. In such
a case, authorities infringing on the defendant's privacy in § 7 may determine the
outcome of the trial, where the central evidence on which the prosecution bases its
case was obtained by infringement of the defendant's rights.
13 In the United States, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Ameri-
can Constitution are similar in substance and language to section 7 of the Charter.
The said Amendments guarantee due process to the defendant and provide that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV, § 1.
1996]
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ples of the violation of basic justice stated in section 7.14 The
rights detailed in sections 8-14 exemplify the general and ab-
stract definition in section 7. They contain the appropriate bal-
ance between the interest of the state and the interest of the
individual; a balance which has already been made by the
legislature.
These sections do not exhaust the defendant's procedural
rights and they may be supplemented by section 7. Thus, the
Canadian Supreme Court used the framework of section 7 to
recognize the right to silence of a prisoner during the course of a
police investigation; a right not found among the Charter's spe-
cific sections.' 5 Section 7 is broader than the specific sections
which follow it, and its scope is not limited to the application of
these sections. 16
Although the right to life section in the Charter has explicit
rights listed, the Israeli Basic Law contains only a general pro-
vision. This does not detract from the use of the Charter as a
guide to interpret the Israeli Basic Law. In Israel, similar to
the broad interpretation given by the Canadian courts to the
Charter, the Basic Law does not enumerate specific rights, nor
does it rule out an interpretation which infers specific rights
from the general rights to life, personal liberty and human dig-
nity. Indeed, Israeli case law has broadly interpreted basic
constitutional provisions from a substantive, not a technical nor
formalistic approach. According to this view, one must not infer
14 See WHITLEY, supra note 8, at 161-163, 165. See RE B.C. Motor Vehicle Act
[1985], 2 S.C.R. 486, 494. Judge Lamer expressed this approach: Sections 8 to 14
address specific deprivations of the right to life, liberty and security of the person
in breach of the principles of fundamental justice, and as such, violations of § 7.
These sections are therefore illustrative of the meaning, in criminal or penal law,
of principles of basic justice. They represent principles which have been recog-
nized by the common law, the international conventions and by the very fact of
entrenchment in the charter as essential elements of a system for the administra-
tion of justice founded upon a belief in the dignity and worth of the human person
and the rule of law. Regina v. Lyons [1987], 2 S.C.R. 309, 354, 373 (N.S.).
15 Regina v. Herbert [1990], 2 S.C.R. 151, 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); Regina v.
Broyles [1991], 131 N.R. 118, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 308, 14 W.C.B. (S.C.C.); Regina v.
Chambers [1990], 2 S.C.R. 1293, 59 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 11 W.C.B. (2d) 191 (S.C.C.);
Robert A. Harvie & Hamar Foster, Different Drummers, Different Drums: The
Supreme Court of Canada, American Jurisprudence And The Continuing Revision
Of Criminal Law Under The Charter, 24 OTTAWA L. REV. 39, 67 (1992).
16 Martin L. Friedland, Legal Rights Under The Charter, 24 CRIM. L. Q. 430,
434 (1982).
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from the positive legislated provisions, a negation of what has
not been legislated.' 7 This is in accordance with the superior
status of constitutional provisions, and in line with their pur-
pose of establishing a way of life.
Furthermore, the rights granted in the Charter, in addition
to being prone to the principles of basic justice according to sec-
tion 7, are also susceptible to the limiting language established
in section 1 of the Charter. Accordingly, the rights guaranteed
in the Constitution are subject to "such reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law, as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."18 The language of clause 1 of the Charter
is similar to section 8 of the Basic Law which states, "[t]here
shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a
law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a
proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than required, or by
regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such
Law.
Infringement of the defendant's rights, according to section
7 of the Charter, is subject to the principles of basic justice. The
protection of rights rooted in the Charter is broader than that
existing in the Basic Law because to legitimize an infringement
on a right one must first proceed through the section 1 filter. If
a specific right of the defendant is also inferred from the right to
life and liberty section, then the infringement of this right con-
tradicts the Constitution if it does not meet the standards of
basic justice. Conversely, where a specific right stands on its
own and is not inferred from section 7, then the infringement is
not subject to the principles of basic justice test.
Principles of basic justice are the product of a proper bal-
ance between competing values. The nature, weight and bal-
ance of these competing values change from one legal system to
another. 19 Interpretation of the Charter has been influenced by
the rights of the defendant according to common law, as they
17 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 83-87; Karp, supra note 3, at 282; H.C. 428/86
Barzili v. The State of Israel, 40(iii) P.D. 505, 619; E.A. 2/84 Neiman v. Chair of the
Central Elections Committee to the 11th Knesset, 39(ii) P.D. 225, 306.
18 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 1.
19 See Re Motor Vehicle Act [1985], 2 S.C.R. 486. "[T]he principles of funda-
mental justice are to be found in the basic tenets and principles, not only of our
judicial process, but also of the other components of our legal system." Id.
1996]
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were implemented in Canada prior to the Charter's enactment.
Principles of basic justice are not limited to procedural justice.20
C. SEARCH
Section 8 of the Charter establishes that every person has
the right to be protected from unreasonable search and seizure.
The purpose of this section is to protect a person's property and
privacy. Under Canadian case law, a reasonableness test 21 has
been formulated establishing that if a private interest out-
weighs a state interest, in particular, the interest of enforcing
the law, then the search and seizure is unreasonable. 22
Canadian case law has established three principles used as
measuring sticks for reasonableness of a search. 23 The first of
these principles is that there must be a framework of lawful au-
thorization. Generally, a valid warrant is a precondition for a
valid search or seizure. The rule is that an unreasonable search
is illegal. Canadian case law has recognized exigent circum-
stances as an exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover,
20 See WHITLEY, supra note 8, at 163, 181; Friedland, supra note 16, at 432.
The principle of basic justice is similar to the principles of due process in the
United States.
21 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects every
person from unreasonable search and seizure, the test being the reasonableness of
the search. The reasonableness is measured according to the circumstances of the
case: the purpose, the justification, the manner and the place of the conduct of the
search. The issue of whether conducting a strip-search of a person's body infringes
on his or her dignity and privacy as a person, is also resolved according to this test.
Using these tests, it has been ruled in the United States, that a search which en-
tails the stripping of a detainee is reasonable, considering the special circum-
stances in the detention centers. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). So too
will the search of a detainee in the street be examined according to tests of reason-
ableness and, in particular, the alternative of postponing the search and con-
ducting it in the police station, the detention center or some other non-public place,
will be taken into account. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983).
Pursuant to English law, the issue of the search of a person's body and the
powers which stem from that search has been established in Police and Criminal
Evidence Act, 1984, 2(9) & 32(1) and in Code of Practice for the Exercise by Police
Officers of Statutory Powers of Stop and Search, 1984, 3.5. Accordingly, the power
to search a person, whether during an arrest or not, does not include the power to
strip him. However, the removal of outer clothing, such as a coat, jacket or gloves
is permissible. According to guidelines established by virtue of that law, when it is
necessary to search under a person's clothing, this must be done far from the pub-
lic eye such as in a police vehicle or in a police station.
22 Hunter v. Southam Inc. [1984], 2 S.C.R. 145, 159-60.
23 See WHITLEY, supra note 8, at 190-191.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss1/2
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a search incidental to an arrest is permitted if the cause of the
arrest itself was based on near certainty. In such a case, the
power to search is contingent upon the power to arrest. One
must distinguish between a search that is incidental to an
arrest and the search of a prisoner. In the first case, in addition
to the right not to be exposed to an unreasonable search, the
detainee also enjoys the presumption of innocence. As opposed
to the power to conduct a search, these two rights grant further
validity to the detainee's right to privacy and make more strin-
gent the requirements of reasonableness. This requirement is
different in character in the case of a prisoner. It is dependent
upon the type of offense with which the person is charged and
the purpose of the search. For example, one must distinguish
between a search for weapons and a search for property which
is connected to a crime, in the latter case there usually is no
urgency.
The second principle is that the source of power does not
have to be a judge. However, it must be a person who is capable
of exercising judicial authority within that milieu, for example,
a university administrator. One additional exception is that
one who is subject to a system of supervision, such as a license
holder, impliedly agrees to reasonable enforcement. 24
The third principle includes a reasonable basis test which
is used for evaluating a search. The test must justify the belief
that a crime has, indeed, been committed. The judge must be
convinced that granting the power to conduct the search will
advance objective justice and balance the enforcement of the
law with the privacy interest of the individual. The interest of
law enforcement cannot surpass that privacy interest based
merely on the suspicion that a crime has been committed.
Therefore, fishing expeditions for evidence will not be permit-
ted. Rather, a reasonable basis that a specific crime has been or
is about to be committed is required.25
In addition, the reasonableness of the search will be ex-
amined as to the conduct of the search and the reasonableness
of the authorizing law. A legal provision which authorizes a
search that does not meet the reasonableness standards is not
24 Chabot v. Manitoba Horse Racing Commission [1987], 26 C.R.R. 360, 366
(Man.), appeal denied, 4 W.W.R.L. lxvi (1987).
25 See WHITLEY, supra note 8, at 195.
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only unreasonable, but also illegal. If the provisions of the au-
thorizing statute are invalid, the search was without authority.
Section 8 and its rules established in case law have also
been applied to the Secret Monitoring Law. The term secret
monitoring has been interpreted to include search or seizure.
In addition, section 8 has been applied to surveillance, whether
by observation alone, filming or other technological means (i.e.
hidden camera, undercover police officers). 26
In Israel, the authority to search a person's things or body
is founded on two primary legal provisions. The first, a provi-
sion in section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Arrest
and Search, 1969, grants authority to conduct a search inciden-
tal to an arrest. The second, section 29 of the Ordinance grants
the authority to search a person's body or things incidental to a
search of the premises. Even before the enactment of the Basic
Law, the Supreme Court ruled that the authority to search in or
on a person's body does not include the authority to penetrate a
person's body, such as by pumping the stomach, giving an en-
ema or performing a blood test without their consent. Addition-
ally, the Basic Law advances the interpretation of the Supreme
Court ruling by forbidding a search of the inside of, as well as
on, a person's body because it invades that person's dignity.
27
Penetration of a person's body constitutes a gross infringement
of his or her dignity and privacy, "as a human being." An inter-
nal search is not permitted unless the legislature has allowed it
in a clear and specific legal provision. 28
Such a legal provision remains valid if it was legislated
prior to the enactment of the Basic Law. However, if legislated
after the Basic Law, the validity of the legislation will be ex-
amined in light of the limiting language in section 8 of the Basic
Law. Protection of personal dignity and privacy is based on sec-
tion 2, which establishes "[tihe life, body or dignity of any per-
son shall not be violated." Section 7 states "all persons have the
26 See WHrrLEY, supra note 8, at 194-198.
27 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 433. The cutting of a person's hair or beard so
they may stand in a line-up also infringes on one's dignity as a person. See BARAK,
supra note 2, at 433.
28 H.C. 391, 373, 370, 355/79, Katalan and others v. Prison Authority and
others, 34(iii) P.D. 294; F.H. 9/83, The Military Court of Appeals and others v.
Va'aknin, 42(3) P.D. 837, Cr.App. 527; 480/85, Kortam v. The State of Israel, 40(iii)
P.D. 676, M.A. (Cr.); 2145/92, The State of Israel v. Gouata, 46(v) P.D. 704.
[Vol. 8:91
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss1/2
THE MAGNA CARTA
right to privacy and to intimacy" and subsection (c) of section 7
reads "[n]o search shall be conducted on the private premises or
body of a person, nor in the body or belongings of a person."
In any event, the exercise of the power to search by the gov-
ernmental authorities, regardless of whether this power was
granted by law enacted before the Basic Law or after it, or
whether it is a matter of an external or internal search of a per-
son's body, it must nonetheless meet the requirements listed in
the aforementioned section 8. Hence, the search must be con-
ducted while protecting a person's dignity and privacy and must
be within the balancing principle in section 8. In the Gouata
case,29 the Vice President of the Supreme Court, Justice M.
Elon ruled:
[S]haming of G-d's image as contained in man is permitted only
when intended for an appropriate end, and when it is a matter of
suspicion of commission of a criminal offense, which is to be pre-
vented or discovered, and in a manner that does not exceed what
is necessary, according to the circumstances of each and every
case - for example, the purpose of the conduct of the search, the
nature of the offence of which he was suspected, the existence of a
state of emergency, the justification for the conduct of the search,
the manner of its conduct, the place of its conduct and the like.30
It can also be inferred that once consent has been granted
to carry out the search, a reasonable measure of fairness must
be maintained in order to prevent trampling the dignity or pri-
vacy of a person subjected to the search. The abandonment of
fairness is permitted only when it is required or necessary for
the purpose of the search.
A "reasonableness" test arose from the aforementioned case
law31 that is introduced through section 8. It includes all as-
pects of reasonableness pertaining to the scope and conduct of
the search. Unlike Canada, there is no provision in the Basic
Law that relates specifically to the reasonableness of con-
ducting a search. Therefore, we must act carefully when we re-
29 2145/92, The State of Israel v. Gouata, 46(v) P.D. 704.
30 Id. at 723.
31 See cases cited supra note 28.
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fer to the Canadian legal system as a model on how to conduct a
bodily search.32
It is doubtful that an illegal search is an unreasonable
search, although, such has been established in Canadian case
law. The legality of a search and its reasonableness must be
distinguished since these terms overlap. It is apparent that an
illegal search is invalid when conducted without lawful author-
ity.33 On the other hand, a search which infringes on a person's
dignity and privacy, but does not meet the requirements of sec-
tion 8 of the Basic Law is unlawful. Thus, it is contrary to fun-
damental principles grounded in the Basic Law. Overlap
between the terms of illegality and unreasonableness is possible
where the legal provision that authorizes the search is unlawful
because it does not meet the requirements of section 8. Accord-
ingly, the search will be unreasonable because the legal provi-
sion which authorizes its conduct fails to meet the requirements
of the limiting language. Therefore, it will be unlawful because
it is not legally valid.
Section 11 of the Basic Law requires governmental authori-
ties to honor human rights. The power to search remains with
the governmental authorities, so that the individual exposed to
an infringement will not be unreasonably searched. However,
as Justice Barak held, the Basic Law also applies in the area of
private law.34 Thus, a search conducted by another person will
also be subject to the principles of the Basic Law. In most cases,
it is illegal for a private individual to conduct a search of an-
other. Although a private individual may conduct an arrest, the
search cannot be incident to that arrest. According to constitu-
tional standards, that individual only has the authority to seize
an obvious weapon. 35
32 The United States Constitution specifically addresses search and seizure.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33 See Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Searches) Ordinance (New Version),
§§ 22(a), 25, 29, (1969) (Can.).
34 AHARON BARAK, PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAw 433 (1992).
Even if the Basic Law does not apply in the sphere of private law, the rulings
which preceded the enactment of the Basic Law as to search of a person's body will
also apply to a search conducted by another private individual. See BARAK, supra
note 2, at 679-97.
35 See Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Searches) Ordinance (New Version),
§ 21, (1969) (Can.).
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D. PROTECTION FROM ARREST AND DETAINMENT
Potential arrest is the most serious threat to a person's
guaranteed right of liberty in sections 7 and 9 of the Charter
and in section 5 of the Basic Law. Protection of liberty means
limiting the power of the authorities who function in criminal
proceedings, namely, police officers, investigators and prosecu-
tors, while emphasizing their duty to apply their authority in a
fair manner.
In Israel, limitations of a person's freedom by arrest can be
done only by a law which represents the values of the state and
is directed at an appropriate end. Even then, it can operate
only to the extent that it does not exceed what is necessary.
Therefore, criminal legislation must be suited to the values of
Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state. The reference to the
criminal code may be applied only when it is essential and nec-
essary, likely to be useful and appropriate to obtain the object of
the prohibition. A legal provision that fails to meet these tests
is liable to be invalidated by the court. Criminal law is a social
tool of last resort. It protects the most vital social interests
against severe violations when there are no efficient, less severe
measures for protection of these interests.3 6
Section 9 of the Charter rules out arbitrary arrest or deten-
tion. In contrast, section 5 of the Basic Law does not limit the
prohibition to arbitrary infringement alone. In fact, the Basic
Law does not establish limitations to this right beyond those
established in section 8. It appears section 5 is broader in its
scope than section 9 of the Charter. The Canadian courts re-
frain from interfering with lawful police activity. It appears
that in Israel, to receive full protection of personal liberty, one
should distinguish between the legality of the arrest and its
constitutional validity. The question of the legality of an arrest
or detention is outside the four corners of the Basic Law. It
should be examined in light of the existence of legal authority to
carry out an arrest or detention, otherwise it is unlawful. Only
a legal arrest or detention will be examined in light of the addi-
tional filter in the Basic Law. A lawful arrest or detention may
36 This article will not address which values are worthy of protection by
means of the criminal process or what is the measure of the minimal infringement
which justifies the defense of the criminal code.
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be invalidated as unconstitutional if it fails to meet that crite-
ria. Since section 5 of the Basic Law is broader in scope than
section 9 of the Charter, the test should also be broader in Israel
than in Canada, and should include the following four test fac-
tors: (1) was there valid authorization; (2) whether denying a
person's freedom is the efficient and appropriate means under
the circumstances; (3) was there just cause for the arrest or de-
tention; and (4) whether the police applied reasonable
judgement.
Canadian case law has established that section 9 is not lim-
ited to physical confinement alone. It also applies to the free-
dom of movement, for example, travel, which may deny access
to an attorney as long as the individual reasonably believes that
the option to act otherwise does not exist.37 The test is subjec-
tive, taking into consideration age, mental ability and emo-
tional state. One may adopt a similar interpretation regarding
section 5 of the Basic Law. This section refers to arrest and
detention as explicit means which infringe on the right to per-
sonal liberty. Moreover, nonphysical limitations can infringe on
this right, for instance, stays of exit from the country, confine-
ment, banishment, deportation or administrative detention.
In a criminal proceeding, the person's right not to be ar-
rested or detained must be balanced at two stages. The first
balancing occurs during the detention until completion of the
proceedings, and the second takes place at the time of imprison-
ment following the conviction. Recent Israeli cases38 have up-
held detaining a person until completion of the proceedings to
protect the safety of the public or the individual, and to guard
against a reasonable fear that the proceedings will be dis-
rupted. This is based on section 21(a) of the Criminal Procedure
Law [Consolidated Version] 1982.
The prevention of danger to public safety or the disruption
of court proceedings is not to be used as a reason to detain a
defendant in prison, when a limitation of liberty, not a total de-
nial, is possible, such as house arrest. The right to personal lib-
37 Regina v. Therens [19851, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 505 (Alta.S.C.C.). See
WHITLEY, supra note 8, at 208.
38 2169/92, Suissa v. The State of Israel, 46(iii) P.D. 338, M.A. (Cr.); 3734/92,
The State of Israel v. Azazami, 46(v) P.D. 72, MA. (Cr.).
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erty is the most basic right.3 9 Neither repulsion inspired by the
offense, nor concern for the efficiency of the criminal proceeding
can justify denial of a person's liberty and keep him under lock
and key.40 These considerations are also relevant for choosing
modes of punishment for one who has been convicted, although,
the objects of arrest, individual deterrence and rehabilitation of
the offender, are broader. It must always be taken into consid-
eration whether the object of the arrest can be achieved through
an alternative which limits, rather than denies personal free-
dom. Whether the matter involves a defendant or a suspect, the
court must also weigh the conditions of the arrest. The ten-
dency of the court to choose an alternative to incarceration will
increase when the conditions of the arrest include degradation
and infringement of human dignity. 41
E. RIGHTS WHICH STEM FROM ARREST OR DETENTION
Section 10 of the Charter recognizes the following rights
which stem from arrest or detention:
1) the right to know the reason of detention;
2) the right of a prisoner/detainee to consult an attorney
and obtain from him guidelines without delay and to receive no-
tice of the existence of this right; and
3) the right to challenge the legality of the detention by
means of Habeas Corpus and to be freed if the arrest/detention
is found to be illegal. 42
Similarly, Canadian case law has recognized these rights as
also stemming from section 7 of the Charter. 43
The right to know the reason of the arrest or detention
means the accused has the right to be informed of the charge.
The duty of notice does not arise where the circumstances are
clear, such as when a person is caught while committing a
crime. The Canadian courts have ruled that a literal interpre-
tation is not required, but rather a substantive explanation of
39 3734/92, The State of Israel v. Azazami, 46(v) P.D. 72, M.A. (Cr.).
40 2169/92, Suissa v. The State of Israel, 46(iii) P.D. 338, M.A. (Cr.).
41 3734/92, The State of Israel v. Azazami, 46(v) P.D. 72, M.A. (Cr.).
42 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 10.
43 See WHrrLEY, supra note 8, at 211-12.
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the guilt.4 4 The duty of explanation does not exist when the de-
fendant, by obstructing justice, prevents the police from fulfil-
ling their duty.45 The Israeli Supreme Court adopted similar
rules prior to the enactment of the Basic Law. 46
F. THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY
Section 10(b) of the Charter grants the defendant the right
to consult with an attorney, but it fails to mention the duty to
appoint an attorney to an unrepresented defendant, or to an in-
digent detainee. 47 The Canadian courts recognized that the de-
fendant must be advised of his right to legal representation.
Martin Friedland notes that the right to legal aid stems from
the right to a fair trial according to section 11 of the Charter. 48
In certain cases, the court must appoint an attorney for the de-
fendant.49 However, such a right apparently does not exist dur-
ing the various stages of the investigation.50
If the defendant does not understand his or her rights, such
rights will be meaningless. Thus, immediate access to an attor-
ney is necessary. However, the right to an attorney is qualified
and not absolute. It has been ruled that the right to an attorney
does not have to precede a legal and reasonable search stem-
ming from an arrest. For example, when there is a suspicion
that the detainee is holding some weapon, and the search is ur-
gent such a right is not available. 51
Canadian case law has established the following rules for
applying section 10:52
1. The police must provide the defendant with a reasonable
opportunity to make use of the right to receive legal advice
without delay.
4 See WHITLEY, supra note 8, at 214.
45 Regina v. Kelly [1985], 17 C.C.C. (3d) 419 (Ont. C.A.).
4 See C.A. 40/56, The Attorney General v. Kdoshim, 10 P.D. 972.
47 It should be noted that such a duty exists in the United States. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
48 See Friedland, supra note 16, at 440; CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982)
pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) § 10.
49 Id.
50 Symposium, The Canadian Constitution, 45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 233
(1982).
51 See Regina v. DeBot [1986], 54 C.R. (3d) 120, 141-43 (Ont. C.A.).
52 See WHrrLEY, supra note 8, at 219.
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2. The police must stop asking questions or any other at-
tempts to gather evidence from the suspect until he or she has
been given a reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney
(unless the suspect explicitly gives up this right).
3. Preventing the suspect's attorney from entering the in-
terrogation room until the conclusion of the interrogation, con-
stitutes a violation of section 10.
In Israel, a case dealing with the right of a detainee to meet
with his attorney recently came before the Court.53 The sus-
pected terrorist was denied the right to meet with his attorney
during the course of his interrogation. The Court held that the
suspect's right to counsel was denied for national security rea-
sons, although, the right of a detainee to meet with an attorney
is founded in criminal procedure law.5 4 Moreover, the Vice
President of the Court, Justice M. Elon, held that the right to
counsel is fundamental and anchored in section 5 of the Basic
Law; another aspect of the right to silence. However, the right
to meet with an attorney, similar to other rights, is not an abso-
lute right, and must be balanced with competing rights and
interests.55
In this situation, the legislature undertook the task of bal-
ancing those competing rights. It established that, with respect
to regular offenses, infringement of the right to counsel is justi-
fied only when it is necessary to the interest of the investiga-
tion, the protection of state security, the protection of human
life or the prevention of a crime. With certain security offenses
in mind, the legislature established only two grounds which
may justify the delay of meeting with the attorney; state secur-
ity and the interests of the investigation. Thus, it can be con-
cluded that the right to counsel is much greater when dealing
with security offenses.
The decision of the Court in Soufian v. The Military Com-
mander,56 may lead one to conclude that the Supreme Court, by
means of the Basic Law, extended the right of a detainee to
53 H.C. 3412/91, Soufian v. The Military Commander in the Gaza Strip and
Others, 47(ii) P.D. 843.
54 See Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], § 29, (1982) (Can.).
55 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 432.
56 H.C. 341291, Soufian v. The Military Commander in the Gaza Strip and
Others, 47(ii) P.D. 843.
1996]
17
PACE INT'L L. REV.
meet with an attorney. However, raising this right to a consti-
tutional level grants it additional importance.
When balancing between the right to an attorney and other
interests such as: the interests of the investigation, protection
of state security etc., one must give great weight to the right to
an attorney. Even if the nature of the interests have not
changed, their weight has. It is possible that previously consid-
ered borderline cases will today tip the scales to favor the right
to counsel. Thus, it is appropriate to place a heavier burden of
proof on the one who claims the existence of limitations on the
right to counsel.
A certain increase in demands had been placed on those re-
sponsible for the interrogation. In Soufian v. The Military Com-
mander,57 the Court held that the interrogator must
periodically re-examine any decision that prevents the detainee
from meeting with his attorney. The moment the investigation
ends the interrogator must permit the detainee to meet with
counsel.
Additionally, the authorities have the duty to inform the
detainee of his basic right to meet with an attorney; a right
which is not explicitly written in the law. The right of notifica-
tion has been recognized in the Supreme Court case Soufian v.
The Military Commander.58 Justice Elon stated that:
[o]ne who does not know of the existence of the right cannot try to
realize it. In particular when it is a matter of a person who has
been arrested and his or her mind is disturbed, and he may not
know how he is to act and what he must do. Therefore the de-
tainee has the right, and the authorities are obligated, to be noti-
fied of his right to meet with a attorney.59
The right to be notified of the infringement of this right has also
been recognized.
The duty of notification evolves from a case by case basis
and is dependent on the nature and length of the police investi-
gation. The police are not obligated to constantly remind the
interrogated person of his or her right to meet with an attorney.
However, when the investigation carries on for days or weeks, it
57 Id. at 846.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 850.
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is appropriate to remind the detainee of his or her right to
counsel.60
The comparison to Canadian law raises issues of whether
the defendant has the right to meet with an attorney, the right
to an appointment of an attorney and the corresponding duty of
the authorities to appoint an attorney for the detainee. The in-
terpretation of the Basic Law and the derivation from the gen-
eral rights include specific rights of the defendant. One must
distinguish between two cases. The first case holds that the
specific right was established in a law prior to the enactment of
the Basic Law. In this case, the question becomes whether it is
possible to derive specific rights for the accused from the Basic
Law beyond those established in the prior law. Since the Basic
Law calls for the preservation of prior existing laws, the prior
law remains valid. In this case, there is a place for a double
interpretation: It can be argued that this situation broadens
the rights granted by the prior law which may go beyond what
the legislature intended. The second case establishes that when
the prior law is silent, it does not establish any specific right.
Then, is this a matter of a lacuna which must be filled?
The right to appoint defense counsel does not have to
change or broaden beyond what is established by law.
61
Although it appears that the Basic Law was not intended to
broaden existing rights defined by specific provisions in the law,
it was intended to protect the rights of the accused. One can
learn from the establishment of the right and its qualifications
that a negative arrangement may exist. However, it is possible
to derive from the right to legal aid, the right to be notified of
this right and the conditions under which a defendant is enti-
tled to receive legal aid.
The Basic Law was intended to protect the rights of the ac-
cused. However, it appears that it was not intended to broaden
existing rights where they are defined by specific provisions in
the law. One can learn from the establishment of the right that
a negative arrangement may exist. It may be appropriate to de-
60 Id. at 852.
61 See Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], § 15, (1982) (Can.).
(Establishing an arrangement for mandatory and permissible appointment of a
defense attorney for the defendant, and as too the mentally ill); The Treatment of
Mentally Sick Persons Law, § 18, (1981) (Can.).
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rive from the right to legal aid, where it exists according to the
law, the right of the defendant to be notified of such right and of
the conditions under which he or she is entitled to receive legal
aid.
G. THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
Section 11 of the Charter establishes an array of rights that
guarantee the accused a fair trial in criminal proceedings. Un-
like section 10 of the Charter, section 11(a) establishes the right
of the defendant to know, without unreasonable delay, the spe-
cific offense with which he or she is charged.62 The question of
time is a substantive question and should be examined accord-
ing to the circumstances of each case. One must also consider
whether the accused is held under arrest or not.
Section 11(b) of the Charter establishes the right to be tried
within a reasonable period of time. The rule states that delayed
justice is no justice.63 Canadian case law has established sev-
eral considerations to examine the speed of the proceedings
under section 11(b): 64
1. The delay of justice caused to the defendant as more time
passes between the charge and the ruling (the test for delay of
justice is subjective).
2. A delay caused by the defendant will not be taken into
account when determining the reasonableness of the delay.
3. The requirements of a reasonable time may change ac-
cording to the nature of the matter. This test is objective and
depends on what is customarily practiced in accordance with
the type of issue.
4. The limited resources of the penal justice system are to
be taken into account. It should be emphasized that delay in
this context is limited to a delay, after the indictment is brought
against the defendant. Until the indictment is brought, one can
62 See WHITLEY, supra note 8, at 222-23; Friedland, supra note 12, at 442.
63 In the United States, the speed of the proceedings depends on the degree of
delay, the reasons for delay, whether the defendant has been denied a right or
whether and to the degree injustice has been caused to the defendant. The Cana-
dian Constitution implicitly includes these criteria for the reasonableness require-
ment. See WHITLEY, supra note 8, at 225-27.
64 Mills v. Regina [1986], 52 C.R. (3d) 1, 64 (S.C.C.).
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infer a defense against such a delay if it is unreasonable from
section 7 of the Charter.
In Israel, the defendant has the right to a trial within a
reasonable amount of time, and the expectation that there will
be no delay of justice. One must weigh the heavy caseload of
the courts with the limitations on the judicial system to estab-
lish a reasonable period of time. This is also a part of the de-
fendant's human dignity.65 For example, in Israel v. Azazami, 66
the court considered the delay of justice to the defendant as a
factor in determining an alternative to detention until comple-
tion of the proceedings. In this case, house arrest was chosen as
the alternative.
The court must consider different circumstances and inter-
ests when balancing the reasonableness of any delay. The judge
should pay particular attention to any delays from the begin-
ning of the investigation to the indictment stage, and the period
from indictment to trial when the defendant is free or incarcer-
ated. When the defendant is incarcerated, the reasonableness
of delay is dependent on the nature and circumstances of the
case. Therefore, it is appropriate to distinguish between the
prosecution delaying an indictment because of a lack of public
interest in the charge, and when there is difficulty in gathering
evidence against the defendant. The rights of the defendant
must be given greater weight while incarcerated. Once the
charge has been brought, the sword of conviction hangs above
the defendant's head. The criminal accusation by nature, car-
ries social, economic, familial and other ramifications of great
impact on the defendant's life. It is clear that after the charge is
brought a delay of justice caused to the defendant has greater
impact on such defendant. When the defendant is incarcerated
pending the completion of the proceedings, it is appropriate to
carefully guard the defendant's right to a speedy trial, and to
treat the prosecution sternly regarding delays. 67
In Canada, the minimum requirement for a fair trial is the
demand for an objective and unbiased judge, who bases his or
her ruling on evidence and logic. The objectivity and indepen-
65 See BARAL supra note 2, at 281.
66 3734/92, The State of Israel v. Azazami, 46(v) P.D. 72, M.A. (Cr.).
67 Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], §§ 51, 52, 53 (1984)
(Can.).
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dence of the judge are necessary, not only to guarantee justice
in specific cases, but also to ensure the faith of the public and
the individual in the legal system.68 Without such a guarantee,
the system cannot command the obedience and respect which
are necessary for the functioning of the courts. The test for lack
of judicial objectivity is a defendant's reasonable fear of bias,
whether or not that bias exists in reality.69
The fairness of a trial will be determined according to ac-
cepted principles of Canadian law, such as the right of the de-
fendant to be heard; granting of sufficient time to prepare the
defense; the right of the accused to be present at his or her trial
and the right to cross examine. 70 The duty of a fair trial ex-
tends to both the police and the prosecution. 71 Thus, the discre-
tion of the investigating and prosecuting authorities is subject
to a test of reasonableness as to any delay.72
The Canadian Supreme Court held that the defendant has
the right to review relevant evidence and materials of the inves-
tigation.73 Sections 11(d) and 7 of the Charter secure those
rights within the defendant's right to a fair trial. The defend-
ant's right to a full defense includes the right to cross examina-
tion. For example, in a sexual offense case, the Canadian Court
struck down a provision which prohibited cross examination of
a complainant with regard to her sexual history.74 This provi-
sion threatened the fairness of the criminal proceeding because
it denied the admissibility of evidence which might have been
68 H.C. 732/84, Tzaban v. The Minister for Religious Affairs, 40(iv) P.D. 141:
'...[T]hat is the faith of the public in that the judicial authority does justice ac-
cording to law. That is the faith of the public that the judging is done in a fair and
neutral manner by giving equal treatment to the parties without a shred of per-
sonal interest in the result. That is the faith of the public in the high moral level of
the judging.. ." See AHARON BARAK, JucIcIAL DISCRETION 292 (1983).
69 Regina v. Valenta [1985], 49 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.); RE Fleming and Regina
[1985], 24 C.C.C. (3d) 264 (Nfld.T.D.); Regina v. Magee [1988], 3 W.W.R. 169, 180
(Atla.Q.B.).
70 See Freidland, supra note 16, at 445; see WHrrLEY, supra note 8, at 238.
71 Regina v. Ittoshat [1970], 10 C.R.N.S. 385 (Que.S.C.); Regina v. Simons
[1975], 34 C.R.N.S. 273, 277 (Ont.CA.); Boucher v. Regina (1955], 1 S.C.R. 16, 23;
Rothman v. Regina [1981], 1 S.C.R. 640 (Ont.S.C.); quoted in WHITLEY, supra note
8, at 238.
72 Mills v. Regina [1986], 52 C.R. (3d) 1, 64 (S.C.C.); Regina v. Young [1984],
40 C.R. (3d) 289.
73 Regina v. Stimchcombe [1991], 8 C.R. (4th) 277 (S.C.C.).
74 Regina v. Seaboyer [1991], 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.).
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relevant to the defense. In light of this, the Court determined
that cross-examination as to sexual history must be permitted
where the purpose is worthy and the probative value of the ex-
amination surpasses its prejudicial consequences. 76
The guarantee to a fair trial also encompasses trial public-
ity. Such publicity protects the defendant from arbitrariness,
injustice and oppression involved in a "secret" trial. It also
serves to inform the public that justice has been done. 76 How-
ever, since trial publicity may implicate morality and national
security, its values must be balanced with competing factors
such as, human dignity and privacy.
Currently, press coverage of a trial is prohibited unless the
court specifically permits it.77 On one hand, press coverage
serves the interest of conducting a fair trial, but on the other
hand such coverage could infringe on the dignity and privacy of
the individuals involved. The conflict between the public and
private interests necessitate retreat from the principle of free
press coverage and subjects media to judicial supervision. The
court must balance these conflicting interests according to the
circumstances of the case.
Justice Barak, opines that the right of a defendant to a fair
trial is part of basic human dignity.78 The right of the defend-
ant to know the charges, the reason for the arrest and the abil-
ity to effectively defend oneself is part of basic human dignity.
It appears to be more convincing to derive these rights from the
right to personal liberty and from the presumption of innocence.
75 Id.
76 Regina v. Squires [1986], 23 C.R.R. 31 (Ont.Prov.Ct.). See also, Aharon
Barak, Freedom of Expression and its Limitations, 40 HAPRAKLrr 5, at 7 (1993).
("[Wihen everything is revealed and everything is exposed truth will win over
lies'."); 334/81, Haginzar v. The State of Israel, 36(i) P.D. 827, 832, M.A. (Cr.) ("It
is a great rule in law that the court will judge in public. This principle is.. .one of
the more important means, which are directed at guaranteeing the conduct of a
fair and unbiased trial. By force of this principle the court stands in its activities
exposed to the public eye and judgement in what is connected to the conduct of the
trial objectively, with judging ability and discretion."); 353/88, Vilner v. The State
of Israel, 45(ii) P.D. 444, 450, M.A. (Cr.); Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
43 (1914) ("[Slunlight is the best purifier and the lamplight is the most efficient
policeman.").
77 Courts Law [Consolidated Version] § 70 (1984) (Can.). It appears that were
§ 70 not so entrenched, it would still meet the requirement of section 8 of the Basic
Law.
78 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 432; Karp, supra note 3, at 74.
1996]
23
PACE INT'L L. REV.
H. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Section 11(d) of the Charter establishes the rule that a man
is presumed innocent until proven guilty. According to section
7, this right is also integral to the protection of life, liberty and
security. 79
By combining the provision in section 11(d) with section 7,
the Canadian courts established the duty of the prosecution to
prove the accused's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt for each
of the elements of the offense. In light of this principle, the
court examines the validity of the legal provisions which place
the burden of proof on the defendant. The validity of a law
which reduces the prosecution's burden of proof and transfers
that burden to the defendant will be examined in light of section
1 which bestows rights and freedoms subject to reasonable lim-
its. It makes no difference if the transfer of the burden relates
to an essential element to the offense,80 to the defense 8l or to
another element, external to the offense which can reduce the
defendant's criminal liability. Even the dropping of an element
of the offense, means that the prosecution is exempt from prov-
ing that element, and therefore, it stands contrary to the princi-
ples of the Charter. It should be noted that in distinguishing
the presumptions which transfer the burden of proof, the dis-
qualification of the legal provision which eliminated an element
of the offense was decided based on the right to life and liberty,
and the principle of basic justice in section 7 of the Charter.8 2
The Canadian courts have applied this basic principle in a
series of cases.8 3 The Canadian Supreme Court established
79 D. MORTON, SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA 147
(1955).
80 Regina v. Vaillancourt [1987], 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118; Regina v. Whyte [1988], 2
S.C.R. 3, 42 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 5 W.C.B. (2d) 141.
81 Regina v. Nagy [1988], 45 C.C.C. (3d) 350 (Ont.C.A.); Regina v. Downey
[1992], 72 C.C.C. (3d) S.C.C. 1; RE Regina v. Keegstra [1990], 61 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 1
C.R. (4th) 129 (S.C.C.); Regina v. Chaulk [1990], 2 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) (the
Supreme Court in Canada ruled that transfer of the burden of proof to the shoul-
ders of the accused in the insanity defense does not contradict the Charter, be-
cause the defense of insanity is not a vital element of the offense and is not a "real"
defense.); See Harvie and Foster, supra note 15, at 86-87.
82 See Regina v. Vaillancourt [1987], 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118; Regina v. Whyte
[1988], 2 S.C.R. 3, 42 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 5 W.C.B. (2d) 141.
83 Regina v. Oakes [1986], 1 S.C.R. 103, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321; RE Boyle and The
Queen [1983], 5 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 35 C.R. (3d) 34 (Ont.C.A.).
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that a presumption which allows for the conviction of a defend-
ant, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt, stands in con-
trast to the principles of the Charter. Presumptions which
transfer the burden of proof to the defendant were disqualified
for being contrary to the presumption of innocence. Thus, it
was established that the presumption does not meet the re-
quirements of section 1.84 Section 11(d) further establishes that
the rebuttal of the defendant's innocence must be done in a fair
and public trial by an independent and unbiased court.
In Israel, any law enacted after the enactment of the Basic
Law is subject to judicial review in light of the criteria in section
8, the limiting clause. Hence, the limiting clause applies if the
law includes 'lightening' the burden of proof placed on the pros-
ecution, or if it includes a transfer of this burden to the defend-
ant. The question remains whether eliminating an element of
the offense will be considered such 'lightening,' as it exempts
the prosecution from proving that element.
Striking down a law which allows the legislature to elimi-
nate an element of an offense is problematic. Such a limitation
stifles the legislature's authority, and freezes the social and
moral development of criminal law. However, the "sieve" in sec-
tion 8 of the Basic Law, which allows one to legitimize a harsh
provision if it is intended for an appropriate end, may imply
that limiting the legislature's authority is appropriate.
8 5
84 Id. The United States Supreme Court disqualified a legal provision which
transferred the burden of proof to the shoulders of the defendant. In contrast to
Canadian case law, the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to disqualify a punitive pro-
vision which eliminates an element of the offense or which transfers the burden of
proof to the one asserting a liability defense. (Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
215 (1977)). It is possible that the change in the stance of the courts, in Canada
and the United States, from the reliance on the Canadian courts, not only on the
presumption of innocence (which is specifically anchored in both nations' constitu-
tions) but also on section 7 of the Charter. See Karp, supra note 3, at 144.
85 It is worth mentioning two legal provisions which have recently been
passed by the Knesset. (PENAL LAw (Introductory Part and General Part) amend.
39, § 34(Q)(a) (1994) (Israel)). Section 34(Q)(a) establishes that an offense must be
proven beyond any reasonable doubt. It should be noted that in the original draft
law the following concluding phrase was recommended: "unless established other-
wise in a contradictory provision." This phrase was dropped during the discus-
sions in the subcommittee of the Law and Constitution Committee, because of an
apparent lack of constitutional justification according to which one may convict
despite the existence of reasonable doubt. Id. The legal provision, provided for in
§ 34(Q)(b), establishes that the person claiming the applicability of a defense car-
ries the preliminary burden of raising reasonable doubt as to its existence, and
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In contrast, Justice Barak, of the Israeli Supreme Court,
argues that human dignity does not include the right to cross
examination.8 6 This opinion is inconsistent with the premise of
this article. The primary goal of cross examination is to chal-
lenge the witness' version of the truth. Cross examination is
the best tool a defendant has to defend against perjurers and
false allegations.
Cross examination plays a central role in the guarantee of a
fair trial. The Israeli courts have, on several occasions, reiter-
ated the importance of cross examination as an efficient tool for
revealing the truth. Denial of this right may cause an injustice
which may disqualify the testimony. Thus, the right to cross
examination must also be recognized as a basic right because it
is part of human dignity.87 In Israel, a person's right to per-
sonal liberty, as established in section 5 of the Basic Law, in-
cludes the presumption of innocence. Accordingly, a person is
innocent until proven guilty.88
Justice Barak opines that the concept of human dignity is
based on the assumption that society has the will to protect it.
A person's right is not to be infringed upon without due process,
such as, the opportunity to be heard. The right of the defendant
to a fair trial is part of his or her human dignity. It is presumed
that a person is innocent until proven guilty.8 9
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
Section 11(g) of the Charter states that a person may not be
convicted for an act or omission which did not constitute an of-
fense at the time it was committed. In addition, section 11(g) of
once he or she has raised such a doubt the prosecution must remove such doubt.
Thus, the prosecution has a heavier burden of proof. Since cases involving the
justification to deny the criminality of the act are rare, and the prosecution still
has a heavier burden, the defendant's burden is not to be regarded as contrary to
the principles of the Basic Law. Id.
86 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 285.
87 Justice Elon supports this proposition: "the right to cross-examination,
similar to the right of the defendant to meet with his attorney, is derived from his
right to personal liberty." F.H. 4390/91, The State of Israel v. Husam ven Mujhad
Haj Yihyeh, (May 7, 1993).
88 2169/92, Suissa v. The State of Israel, 46(iii) P.D. 338, 432, M.A. (Cr.); 37341
92, The State of Israel v. Azazami, 46(v) P.D. 72, 76, M.A. (Cr.).
89 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 281; P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA
857, 1100 (3rd ed. 1992).
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the Charter contains an exception to the principle of legality.
Section 11(g) establishes that a reduction in the sentence
founded in the law will apply retroactively. The reason for this
lies in the fact that the amendment reflects society's view as to
the seriousness of the offense: if the seriousness of the offense
has lessened in the eyes of the public then the defendant should
enjoy a lighter sentence.
Canadian courts have held that the provision should be ap-
plied proportionally in order to guarantee that such provision
will be significant in every case where a sentence is reduced by
law. 90 This means the sentence imposed must be reduced in a
manner directly related to and proportional to the sentence.
This principle is basic and central to Israeli law which was
recognized long before the enactment of the Basic Law. 91 The
exception which allows the defendant to benefit from a reduc-
tion of a sentence established in the law was recognized in Is-
raeli case law92 for these same reasons. Justice Barak states
that the imposition of criminal liability on behavior which did
not constitute an offense at the time it was committed, infringes
on human dignity. 93 Therefore, a law which retroactively estab-
lishes that certain behavior constitutes a criminal offense, will
be disqualified by the court if it fails to meet the requirements
of section 8.
Yehudit Karp states that the principle of legality in crimi-
nal law is anchored in the opening phrase of section 8 of the
Basic Law; "It]he rights according to this Basic Law shall not be
infringed except by a statute... . ,94 This principle is based on
the idea that the criminal code must supply a clear guideline as
to what is permitted and prohibited, and thereby, enable each
person to plan their actions in advance.
Recently, the prohibition of retroactive punishment was
based in section 3 of the Penal Law.95 The Penal Law estab-
lishes that a law which creates an offense will not apply to an
act done before the day of its legal publication, or the day of its
90 McCutcheon v. Toronto [1983], 41 O.R. (2d) 652, 657-68 (Ont.H.C.).
91 See S.Z. FELLER FOUNDATIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW 1, 3-21 (1984); YuvAL LEv
& ELIEZER LEDERMAN, PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LIABILrTY 62-127 (1981).
92 See 63/89, Mizrahi v. The State of Israel, 43(iv) P.D. 388 M.A. (Cr.).
93 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 281.
94 See Karp, supra note 3.
95 PENAL LAW (Introductory and General Parts) amend. 39, § 3 (1994) (Israel).
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coming into force, whichever is later. Moreover, a law which
establishes a harsher sentence than the one existing at the time
an offense was committed, will not apply to an act committed
prior to the day of its legal promulgation, or the day of its com-
ing into force, whichever is later. The amendment also added to
the Penal Law, provisions which qualify the principles as to the
cancellation of an offense after its commitment,96 and as to the
amendment of legislation after the commission of an offense.
The amendment is more lenient on the defendant 97 which was
practiced in Israeli case law before the amendment.
The Canadian courts derived the doctrine of vagueness
from the principle of legality. A vague law does not meet the
requirements of reasonableness in section 1 of the Charter.
98
The vagueness doctrine does not require that the law be abso-
lutely clear. The use of general terminology and the existence
of various interpretations of the law are unavoidable in any act
of legislation. However, the court will declare a law to be un-
constitutional if it does not provide sufficient guidance or draw
sufficiently clear standards as to what is prohibited and how an
individual is to behave. A vagueness defense was accepted by
the Canadian Supreme Court when the law infringed on the
principles of basic justice and the right to liberty. 99
Similarly, the Israeli Supreme Court' 00 criticized the of-
fense of public mischief found in section 105 of the Criminal
Code Ordinance10 for being undefined, unbound, and clearly
contrary to the legality principle in criminal law. It appears
that this section would not meet the requirements of section 8.
If brought before the court for judicial review according to the
Basic Law, it would be invalidated for failing to provide suffi-
cient guidance. Therefore, it would contradict the principle of
legality.
96 Id. at § 4.
97 Id. at § 5.
98 RE Regina v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society [1992], 93 D.L.R. (4th)
36, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).
99 See Regina v. Morales [1992], 77 C.C.C. (3d) 91, 17 W.C.B. (2d) 580 (S.C.C.);
Regina v. Robson [1985], 19 C.C.C. 137 (B.C.C.A.).
100 See 53/54, Eshed, Mercaz Zmani Letahbura v. The State Attorney, 8 P.D.
785 M.A. (Cr.).
101 See Criminal Code Ordinance § 105 (1936), amended by § 198 (1977)
(Israel).
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Yehudit Karp argues 10 2 the term "law" in section 8 of the
Basic Law is not to be interpreted literally, but rather by its
substantive meaning, referring to any public act of legislation,
phrased in clear and concise language. The requirements of
publicity, clarity and certainty were intended to provide gui-
dance for the behavior of the individual in advance of and not
after the fact. The realization of this goal denies the creation of
offenses by judicial legislation. This opinion carries considera-
ble weight, and therefore, a substantive test of the legality prin-
ciple should be adopted. It is unfair to demand a person act
with certainty without enabling him or her to know clearly and
with advance warning which behavior is prohibited. In order
for the penal code to fulfill its task of directing and guiding be-
havior, the prohibitions must be publicized.
J. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter establishes that a
person is not to be charged more than once for something he or
she has done and no more than one sentence may be placed on
the defendant for the same action. A similar provision exists in
Israel in section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 10 3 This sec-
tion establishes that a person is not to be judged for an action if
he or she has been acquitted or convicted for an offense included
in that action. As an exception to this rule, the concluding
phrase of section 5 states that if such an act caused a person's
death, he or she can be tried for that act even if already con-
victed for another offense resulting from that action.104 A de-
fendant's right not to be tried twice for the same act may be
derived from his or her right to liberty according to the Basic
Law. Trying a person twice endangers his or her liberty beyond
a reasonable degree. Once the defendant's criminal liability has
been examined by the court, there is an assumption that justice
has been served. However, in the face of that right stands the
right to life which causes the principle of double jeopardy to re-
treat. It appears that a similar result would stem from the
terms of section 8 in the Basic Law.
102 See Karp, supra note 3, at 21 of the draft.
103 Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], § 5 (1982) (Israel).
104 Id.
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K. FREEDOM FROM CRUEL AND UNJUST PUNISHMENT
According to section 12 of the Charter, the defendant has
the right not to be subject to cruel unjust treatment or punish-
ment.' 0 5 Canadian case law interprets this right as a constitu-
tional protection from unusual treatment or punishment, which
translates into such being exaggerated or humiliating. 10 6 This
right will be examined in light of the nature of the punishment
and its influence on the sentenced person.
The punishment is cruel or unjust if the punishment super-
sedes standards of decency. The judge must examine the cir-
cumstances of the case, the severity and specific circumstances
of the crime and the characteristics of the defendant. Then,
the judge must decide the appropriate punishment in considera-
tion of actual punishment, rehabilitation or individual
deterrence. 1 0 7
On the basis of the section 12, which prohibits cruel and
unjust punishment, and in combination with the tests estab-
lished in section 7, the Canadian courts developed rules for dis-
qualifying a punitive provision due to the unsuitability of the
punishment. The punishment will be considered cruel and un-
just under the following circumstances: 10 8
1. The punishment is of a character which outrages public
conscience or injures human dignity.
2. The principle of relativity - the punishment exceeds
what is necessary to achieve the social interest protected by the
prohibition, in relation to the purposes of the legitimate puni-
tive goals and other alternatives sufficient to achieve these
goals.
3. A punishment which is administered arbitrarily and not
based on approved standards. This section will also apply in
the context of legislation which relates to mental health or to
practices of forced treatment. 10 9
Subsequently, the court prohibited physical punishment,
lobotomies and castrations, as well as punishments which are
105 A parallel provision appears in the eighth Amendment of the American
Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
106 Regina v. Smith [1987], 5 W.W.R. 1 (S.C.C.).
107 See WHITLEY, supra note 8, at 261.
108 See Regina v. Smith [19871, 5 W.W.R. 1 (S.C.C.).
109 See WHITLEY, supra note 8, at 263.
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clearly disproportionate to the offense. In this framework, the
court did not uphold a minimum punishment of seven years for
a drug trafficking offense, without considering the circum-
stances of the offense. 110 It was established that because of the
multiplicity of possible circumstances for committing the of-
fense, such a serious minimum punishment was disproportion-
ate to the severity of the crime. Accordingly, the courts upheld
the legality of a mandatory twenty-five year sentence for
murder. 11
In the opinion of Justice Barak, the death penalty, a life
sentence without parole, torture, humiliation, physical blows,
confiscations and forced labor all stand contrary to human dig-
nity. 11 2 Also, humiliating conditions of arrest or detention in-
fringe on human dignity. 1 3 Human dignity is a minimum
guarantee of human existence; material and spiritual punish-
ment"14 which is totally disproportionate to the offense commit-
ted infringes on human dignity.
One can derive the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment from section 8 and its condition that one not exceed
that which is necessary. The Basic Law can be used as a guide-
line for examining punishments established in laws passed af-
ter the Basic Law. The conditions of section 8 are not only
guidelines, but a "normative umbrella" which covers every piece
of legislation, balances the values and examines the reasonable-
ness of all government actions. It places a limitation on the
courts when sentencing and requires that punishment must fit
the crime. The degree of injury in the punishment will be ex-
amined in light of the substance of the matter, the circum-
stances of the case and the desired end with particular
attention to the appropriate means for obtaining the goal.
110 In re Smith v. The Queen [1987], 58 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.) 85; Karp, supra
note 3, at 21.
1il Regina v. Luxen [1990], 79 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
112 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 280; H. Cohn, The Values of a Jewish and Dem-
ocratic States: Matters in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 9
HAPRAKALnr 28 (1984).
113 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 280; 3734/92, The State of Israel v. Azazami,
46(v) P.D.72 M.A. (Cr.).
114 See H.C. 161/94, Atri v. The State of Israel, (not yet published): "the peti-
tioner's dignity as a person necessitates care for minimal existence as a human."
See BARAK, supra note 2, at 280; Cohn, supra note 112, at 29.
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The question is whether, in the framework of the conditions
of minimum injury, the court must examine the existence of al-
ternative means outside the framework of the criminal proceed-
ings, for example, administrative fines. Under this
interpretation, the courts may end up with much more power
than the legislature intended to grant. Consistent with this in-
terpretation, is the possibility that a person who committed a
crime will not carry a criminal stigma, despite the clear declara-
tion of the legislature that such an act does indeed justify crimi-
nal stigma. It is not appropriate for the court to determine
what constitutes a crime, but only to determine the nature and
degree of the punishment.
L. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
Section 11(c) of the Charter grants the criminal defendant
the right not to testify against him or herself. The fact that the
defendant does not testify will not be weighed against him or
her. Section 13 of the Charter grants every witness the right
not to give any evidence which will incriminate him or her in
any other proceeding. A witness' testimony cannot be used
against him or her, with the exception of later testimony for
perjury. In accordance with this rule, the cross-examination of
a defendant also cannot relate to the previous testimony of such
defendant given in a preliminary, or in an earlier trial for the
same charge. 11 5 According to Canadian case law, a defendant
can be cross-examined as to testimony given in a previous trial
when the purpose of the investigation and its results relate to
the reliability of the witness and not to the content of the previ-
ous testimony. The claim is that such a cross-examination does
not infringe on the defendant's privilege against self incrimina-
tion and advances the pursuit of the truth.11
6
Section 13 of the Charter recognizes the defendant's right
to remain silent. However, a prisoner/detainee is not entitled to
the warning that anything he or she says may be used against
him or her in court. The right to remain silent can also be found
115 Regina v. Yakeleya [1985], 20 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont.C.A.); Regina v. Sopho-
now [1984], 12 C.C.C. (3d) 272 (Man.C.A.).
116 Johnstone v. Law Society of British Columbia [1987], 40 D.L.R. (4th) 550,
15 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.); R. v. B. (W.D.) [1987], 45 D.L.R. (4th) 429, 38 C.C.C. (3d)
12 (Sask.C.A.).
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in section 7.117 If the police unfairly deny a person's right to
remain silent, it will be considered a violation of section 7.118
The right to remain silent is part of human dignity because
a defendant cannot be forced to give his or her version, but the
inference of adverse conclusions from that silence does not con-
tradict human dignity.119 Indeed, to date, this is the position
which Israeli case law has adopted. However, since the right to
silence is based in the Basic Law (and if in fact, the right consti-
tutes a part of human dignity; as an expression of a free, auton-
omous being, with freedom of choice, will and action), greater
weight must be given to the defendant's right to silence, or it
becomes devoid of meaning. Once the defendant has been
granted this right, it is appropriate that its exercise not be held
against her, as though that right were not granted by law. In
light of this, we need to make a new examination of the existing
rulings since this basic right has been elevated to constitutional
status. It will be further noted that the right to remain silent
may be derived from the assumption that a person is presumed
innocent until proven guilty. This presumption is part of per-
sonal liberty and the right to dignity. 120
Israeli case law has rejected the practice of obtaining evi-
dence by infringing on the privilege against self-incrimination,
the fruits of the poisonous tree. Excluding evidence obtained in
an unlawful manner is possible only under the Secret Monitor-
ing Act and the Protection of Privacy Act.' 21 In cases where evi-
dence was obtained by severe infringement of the privilege
against self incrimination, it is appropriate to exclude that evi-
dence, otherwise, the defendant's right will be emptied of mean-
ing. It may be appropriate to distinguish between a technical
injury to the privilege, and a severe and outright infringement.
It may also be appropriate to adopt a test which changes accord-
ing to the circumstances, and does not apply the doctrine of the
fruits of the poisonous tree without distinction. Another possi-
bility is to broaden the interpretation of the term "other harass-
117 Regina v. Herbert [1990], 2 S.C.R. 151, 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); Regina v.
Broyles [1991], 131 N.R. 118, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 308, 14 W.C.B. (S.C.C.); Regina v.
Chambers [1990], 2 S.C.R. 1293, 59 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 11 W.C.B. (2d) 191 (S.C.C.).
118 Rothman v. Regina [1981], 1 S.C.R. 640, (Ont.S.C.).
119 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 433.
120 See BARAK, supra note 2, at 280.
121 See WHITLEY, supra note 10, at 197.
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ment" in the Protection of Privacy Act, to include any
infringement of human dignity. 122
M. REMEDIES
Section 24(1) of the Charter establishes that any person
whose rights have been infringed or denied may turn to the
court and request a remedy that is appropriate and just under
the circumstances. The term "appropriate remedy" is a vague
and limited term in the criminal context. Remedies of acquittal
or retrial may be appropriate under certain circumstances.
123
In addition, section 24(2) establishes that the Court will exclude
evidence if it was obtained in a manner which infringes on indi-
vidual rights.124
To determine whether evidence obtained in violation of the
Charter should be excluded, one must examine all the circum-
stances of the case, as well as the manner in which the evidence
was obtained. This includes the extent and severity of the in-
jury to human dignity and social values, precipitated by the ob-
taining of the evidence, the severity of the case, the importance
of the evidence, the good faith of the one who infringed on the
Charter and the existence of circumstances which justified the
action. For example, urgent action intended to prevent the de-
struction of evidence may be a factor that persuades the court
not to apply section 24(2).125 There do not appear to be many
cases in which the doctrine will be applied in Canada. It will
only be applied in cases of gross or deliberate infringement, but
not in cases of technical infringement of the Charter or infringe-
ment in good faith. 126
The Basic Law does not include remedies for breach of a
right. It would be appropriate for Israel to adopt the Canadian
122 See F.H. 9/83, The Military Court of Appeals and Others v. F. Va'aknin,
42(iii) P.D. 837.
123 See Symposium, supra note 45, at 243-4.
124 This provision is more limited than the doctrine of the fruits of the poison
tree which is applied in the United States. This automatically excludes all evi-
dence obtained illegally, even when it is a matter of only a technical infringement
and when the authorities who acted illegally did so in good faith. U.S. v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 898 (1984). These considerations will be taken into account when apply-
ing the discretion granted the Canadian Court.
125 See Symposium, supra note 45, at 243.
126 See Symposium, supra note 45, at 243.
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approach. The Canadian Supreme Court has established three
criteria for the disqualification of evidence obtained in breach of
the Charter 127:
1. If the evidence may affect the fairness of the trial, such
as an admission obtained by trickery or a statement obtained in
breach of the defendant's right to consult with an attorney.
However, the Court tends not to exclude evidence when it does
not constitute an infringement of the privilege against self-in-
crimination. Real evidence will be excluded only when obtained
by gross breach of the Charter. The Court has excluded most
evidence that breached section 10(b) which provides the right to
counsel.
2. The severity of the breach of the Charter and whether
the infringement was done in good faith and on reasonable
grounds.
3. Whether excluding the evidence will detrimentally affect
the court system. For example, when it is clear that a crime has
been committed, particularly a serious crime. Where the sub-
mission of the evidence will affect the fairness of the trial, the
severity of the offense will not outweigh the submission of the
evidence.
N. CONCLUSION
This article examined the significance and implications of
the Basic Law. The true scope of the criminal defendants'
rights will be clarified over time as they are discussed and
honed in criminal law.
The comparison of the Canadian Charter with the Basic
Law illustrates the significant differences between them. The
Canadian Charter details the rights of the accused in sections
8-14, beyond what is established in the dignity and freedom sec-
tion, a detailing which does not exist in the Basic Law. This
difference requires caution when operating under the Canadian
legal system, particularly because of the interpretation given to
the Canadian Charter by the Canadian courts. It is evident to
all that the terms "human dignity and liberty" cannot include in
them every single right. Boundaries must be established for the
extension of these terms, and these boundaries may necessitate
127 Regina v. Collins [1987], 1 S.C.R. 265, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1.
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the conclusion that a certain right, which is granted the defend-
ant according to the Canadian Charter, does not constitute a
part of human dignity and liberty. Therefore, it is not granted
to the criminal defendant under Israeli law. One can only hope
that this lacuna, will be filled soon by way of legislation.
A further issue which arises from the discussion of the
rights of the defendant in criminal law deals with the relation-
ship between the rights anchored in the Basic Law, the limita-
tions on their breach and the law which was previously in force.
The Basic Law does not change or override any previously en-
acted legislation. Cases may arise in which the previous law
does not guarantee the defendant's rights in the same degree as
the Basic Law. The right of the defendant may be legally
breached although the same breach would be considered illegal
according to the tests of the Basic Law. Therefore, it is appro-
priate to subject the previous law to the same judicial review as
the Basic Law.
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